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tional metaphysical sense. The question ought not be framed in terms of
the mind-body problem; it is instead an ethical and existential question. Is
this entity a person? Many Nazis answered ‘no’ in the case of Jews. Those
who disagree do not do so based on privileged access to facts and knowledge. Declaring that something is a person expresses a decision, a commitment to treat that being in a certain way.
Very well, but can one be wrong about such decisions? Van Fraassen’s
answer is pragmatic, “Of course; there are conditions under which we will
revise a judgment. That revision would then imply the belief that they
were never persons at all” (191). Yes, but the question isn’t whether under
different circumstances one might have believed otherwise. Could one
affirm that p and yet not-p be the case? He treats this as Carnap treated all
“external” questions: framed in a hopelessly realist fashion, it ought not be
entertained. The same goes for philosophical theology: “Encounter with
the divine does not mean . . . contemplation of a theoretically postulated
hypothesis of which neither science nor we ourselves have any need”
(193). What about such theological hypotheses as the trinity and incarnation? Assume these have positive value in shaping the Christian’s religious stance. If so, a Christian empiricist might very well use these constructs, but van Fraassen seems to have left no room for actually believing
such doctrines to be true. It seems to me the empiricist is just as likely to
dismiss these ancient creedal notions along with angels, demons, and
supernatural intervention, which he rejects as the mythology of ancient
folk (186).
Although it has not emerged in this review, themes from Continental
philosophy and theology are often used for the sake of illustration.
Without some knowledge of existentialism, the reader will find parts of the
book rather puzzling. Van Fraassen’s strength is in his challenge to epistemology; however, his own proposals are often vague. That’s to be expected in a work aimed at a general audience, but the philosophical reader
looking for van Fraassen’s best arguments may be disappointed.

Radical Interpretation in Religion, edited by Nancy K. Frankenberry.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi, 232. £17.95
(paper).
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame
This volume collects papers that were written for a conference on Radical
Interpretation in Religion that was sponsored by Dartmouth College and
held in October 2000. The conference was organized to honor Hans H.
Penner, who was, before his retirement in 2001, Kelsey Professor of
Religion at Dartmouth. The editor has divided the volume into three parts.
The first, whose title is “Pragmatics,” contains papers by Terry F. Godlove
Jr., Jeffrey Stout, Richard Rorty and Wayne L. Proudfoot. The second,
which is entitled “Culture and Cognition,” includes papers by Catherine
M. Bell, E. Thomas Lawson and Maurice Bloch. And the third, which bears
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the title “Semantics,” consists of papers by Hans H. Penner, Nancy K.
Frankenberry and Jonathan Z. Smith. The editor has written an introduction to each of the three parts as well as a preface to the entire volume.
Because the ten papers discuss many different topics, the book lacks thematic unity. In this respect, it resembles many other examples of the
festschrift genre. It is therefore difficult to formulate any informative generalizations about the book’s contents. The authors do share an interest in
methodological and theoretical issues in the academic study of religion.
Moreover, most of them approach such issues from within the academic
culture of religious studies; it is the primary disciplinary affiliation of eight
of the ten authors. The outsiders are Rorty, of course, and Bloch, who is a
professor of social anthropology. This feature of the book no doubt helps
to explain a striking fact about the papers it contains. They make almost
no contact with current debates in philosophy of religion as it is practiced
by those whose primary disciplinary affiliation is philosophy. Readers
who are looking for contributions to those debates will find the book disappointing. Its engagement with philosophy is almost completely restricted to addressing the question of whether theories in philosophy of mind
and language constructed by Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson and
Rorty can be of assistance to practitioners of the discipline of religious
studies when they interpret religious phenomena.
In her preface, Frankenberry suggests that all of the authors share at least
three methodological commitments. First, they are committed to “holistic
ways of thinking about the interrelations of language, meaning, beliefs,
desires, and action” (p.xiv). Second, they stand in a tradition of religious
studies that “explains religion in entirely naturalist terms, rather than on
supernatural or faith-based premises” (p.xiv). Third, they hold that a
descriptively adequate definition of religion “must include ‘superhuman
agent’ or one of its variants as characteristic of what makes ritual action or
belief specifically ‘religious’ for believers and interpreters alike” (p. xiv).
This suggestion seems to me quite plausible, and it has one important consequence. Since the entities the authors have in mind when they speak of
superhuman agents are such things as ghosts, demons, angels and gods, not
extremely powerful space aliens, their naturalism together with their stand
on definitional adequacy commits them to a reductive attitude toward the
whole domain of religious belief and action. As Frankenberry puts the
point, “all the authors thus adopt an externalist view of the subject matter
and do not offer much to please religious realists or those who hanker after
Radical Orthodoxy in theology” (p.xiv). The reductive naturalism shared
by the authors is, of course, a controversial point of view, even within the
confines of religious studies. Some of the authors offer considerations
meant to support it, but none of them addresses any challenges to it. So the
book does not provide a balanced treatment of arguments for and against a
reductively naturalistic approach to interpreting and explaining religious
thought and action. Readers with an interest in serious debate about the
merits of reductive naturalism will have to look elsewhere.
Having said a bit about what is not to be found in the book, I turn to the
task of conveying to my readers some information about what it does contain. I shall say a few words about each of the ten papers.
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The papers in the first part focus on philosophical topics. Godlove
defends the use of propositional attitudes in interpreting religious behavior. He argues for the conclusion that “when we detach a range of bodily
movements from what we had formerly taken to be rationalizing religious
beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and the like—more generally, from a context
of discursivity—we thereby let lapse a necessary condition for seeing them
as religious practices” (p. 23). In the course of the argument, he provides a
summary of Davidson’s account of radical interpretation. Stout’s paper is
motivated by the conviction that Brandom’s work needs an introduction to
a religious studies audience because “the massiveness and theoretical intricacy of his 1994 book, Making It Explicit, have kept it from having the influence it deserves to have on neighboring fields” (p. 25). In order to remedy
this situation, Stout presents an outline of Brandom’s position and compares it to views expressed by Davidson and Rorty. Invoking the doctrine
of the ontological priority of the social, which he derives from a paper on
Heidegger by Brandom, Rorty argues that whether we should just stop
talking about God is wholly a matter of cultural politics. He urges us to
acknowledge that “it is possible to agree that society should grant private
individuals the right to formulate private systems of belief while remaining militantly anti-clerical” (p.76). It is worth noting that Rorty has recently made his own anti-clerical commitments explicit, avowing that “secularists of my sort hope that ecclesiastical organizations will eventually wither
away.”1 Proudfoot’s paper is devoted to the religious thought of William
James. Identifying the Jamesian religious hypothesis that there is an
unseen moral order in the universe congruous with human thought and
action with a kind of panpsychism, Proudfoot claims that “at the end of the
twentieth century, that belief is no longer plausible” (p.85). He contends
that “the moral order consists of what men and women have put there, of
Geist, and the proper way to study it is through the humanities and social
sciences, especially history” (p.92).
The second part of the book contains papers that have a more empirical
orientation. Bell raises doubts about how the concept of belief is deployed
in some studies of religion. Consider, for example, the claim that the
Chinese believe in spirits, which she finds stated even in sophisticated literature on Chinese religion and culture. Bell points out that there are
many Chinese positions on spirits found in the historical record, and she
argues that any village or urban neighborhood in China, Taiwan or Hong
Kong yields “evidence that individuals are very aware of the number of
possible opinions and thus have located their own position—if it is clear
enough to be called that—as a matter of some choice and deliberation”
(p.111). Lawson discusses the prospects for investigating religious belief
using the techniques of cognitive science. He reports experiments that confirm the following claims: “(1) that people have converging intuitions
about the efficacy, i.e., well-formedness, of rituals; (2) that, when judging
the efficacy of a ritual, superhuman agency will be more important than
any other aspect of ritual; and (3) that people will regard having an appropriate agent as relatively more important than the particular action
involved” (p.123). Bloch attacks the view that religious beliefs must seem
counterintuitive to those who have them using a Malagasy example. As he tells the
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story, when Welsh Calvinist and Norwegian Lutheran missionaries went
to Madagascar, they arrived at the conclusion that, in order to become
Christians, the Malagasy would have to give up their belief in sampy,
which the missionaries called “idols.” They overlooked rituals and practices involving ancestors because they did not seem to the Malagasy suitable subjects for questioning and choice. According to Bloch, “this fact
explains much of characteristic contemporary religious activity in Christian
Madagascar, which is accompanied by what looks very much like ancestor
worship” (p. 135). Since accepting the existence of ancestors does not
require the special effort involved in belief in counterintuitive beings, “to
the Malagasy even today, after total familiarization with a Semitic religion,
the idea of ‘converting’ somebody to a belief in ancestors is ridiculous, like
converting them to a belief in the existence of fathers” (p. 137).
Methodological issues in religious studies occupy center stage in the
papers grouped together in the third part of the book. Penner takes it to be
a fundamental principle of interpretation that sentence meaning is always
literal meaning. He also proposes definitions according to which a religion
is a communal system of propositional attitudes and practices related to
superhuman agents, a myth is an orally transmitted story about the deeds
of superhuman agents, and a ritual is a communal system of actions
involving verbal and nonverbal interaction with superhuman agents.
Given naturalism’s assumption that there are no superhuman agents, from
Penner’s principle of interpretation “we can conclude that myth and ritual
do indeed entail information and the information is false” (p. 169). Starting
from Davidson’s claim that a metaphor has only literal meaning and so
says only what shows on its face, Frankenberry launches an assault on the
more general view that religious language has symbolic meaning, which is
supposed to be another kind of meaning over and above literal meaning.
She argues that her criticism of the idea of symbolic religious meaning
“illuminates the semantic confusions created, for example, by Paul Tillich’s
systematic theology of God as ‘Being-Itself’ beyond conceptualization, by
Reinhold Niebuhr’s rehabilitation of biblical symbols so that they could be
taken ‘seriously but not literally,’ and by Rudolf Bultmann’s demythologizing program that was unable to say what ‘Resurrection’ meant once it was
no longer thought of as the resuscitation of a dead corpse” (p.179). Smith
juxtaposes two stories. One is about how the concept of manna functions
in biblical narrative; the other is about how the concept of mana functions
in social scientific theories of religion in the work of Durkheim, LéviStrauss and others. The two stories suggest interesting questions about the
use of terminology drawn from religion in theories that have explanatory
goals. Smith doubts that “we ought to rest content with reproducing
native lexicography, and, thereby, give in to the prevalent ethos of localism, branding every attempt at generalization a Western imposition”
(p.211). He urges us to recognize that understanding how the native
speakers use such words as “mana” is no substitute for “the systematic
stipulative and precising procedures by which the academy contests and
seeks to control second-order, specialized usage” (p. 212).
I enjoyed reading some of the lore about religion in this volume that
was fleshed out with a good deal of concrete empirical detail. Bloch’s
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account of the encounter between Christian missionaries and the Malagasy
is a wonderful cautionary tale about cross-cultural misunderstanding.
And Smith’s erudite history of the uses of the term “mana” in theorizing
about religion is fascinating. I also greatly admire what Stout has succeeding in doing in his clear and succinct sketch of major aspects of Brandom’s
position. Perhaps only those who have struggled with Making It Explicit
themselves will be able to appreciate fully the difficulties that had to be
overcome in writing his paper.
However, I think that the volume does not contain much that will be of
interest to philosophers of religion, or at least to those among them whose
primary disciplinary affiliation is philosophy. Let me support this negative judgment by means of some critical comments on the papers by
Proudfoot and Rorty.
No doubt panpsychism is attractive to only a few contemporary
philosophers. But if we attend to James’s general point about belief in a
cosmic moral order that is not a human product, we ought to be suspicious
of Proudfoot’s judgment that this belief is no longer plausible. No longer
plausible to whom? The social sciences, to whose authority Proudfoot is
willing to appeal, tell us that Christianity and Islam, which involve commitments to such an objective moral order congruous with human thought
and action, are attracting converts in large numbers in many parts of the
world. The people to whose secularized plausibility structures his judgment correctly applies constitute a fairly small minority of humanity, concentrated mainly in Western Europe and American academic institutions.
As I see it, moreover, Proudfoot underestimates the extent to which
James’s religious concerns continue to animate many people who are at
home in postmodern culture. Charles Taylor expresses the point vividly
in his recent book, Varieties of Religion Today. Taylor portrays James as feeling the pull of both the view that religion provides an excessively selfindulgent perspective on the world, uncourageous and unmanly, and the
view that religion provides us with access to something more, bigger, outside ourselves. For Taylor, James is our great philosopher of the cusp,
telling us “more than anyone else about what it’s like to stand in that open
space and feel the winds pulling you now here, now there.”2 And so
Taylor concludes that it is because James “stands so nakedly and so valuably in this exposed spot that his work has resonated for a hundred years,
and will go on doing so for many years to come.”3 In my opinion, Taylor’s
sympathetic appreciation of James is very insightful. Many people nowadays, both believers and those who lack belief, do indeed stand on this
cusp, at least from time to time, and James’s religious concerns remain
important. At any rate, James continues to speak powerfully to me.
Rorty’s paper gives us more of the sort of thing we have come to expect
from him since he threw off the yoke of abiding by the standards of tight
argument that are normative for the community of analytic philosophers.
One example has some puzzling features. Rorty is notorious for once having claimed that truth is whatever your peers will let you get away with
saying. Since his philosophical peers did not let him get away with saying
this, it appears that his claim turned out to be self-refuting. Stout’s paper
now assures us that “Rorty has long since given up the old pragmatic habit
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of running truth and justification together by saying such things as: ‘Truth
is whatever your peers will let you get away with saying’” (p. 30). Yet
Rorty’s paper contains a less general claim of exactly this kind; he asserts
that “what counts as an accurate report of experience is a matter of what a
community will let you get away with” (p. 61). What puzzles me is that
Rorty also says in a footnote that he is “grateful to Jeffrey Stout for detailed
and very helpful comments on a earlier draft of this chapter” (p. 77). Did
Stout simply overlook the assertion about accuracy I have quoted? Or did
Rorty insert it in a later draft that Stout did not see?
William P. Alston’s doxastic practice approach to epistemology will, I
think, allow us to see how the epistemic status of experiential beliefs can be
subject to social constraints.4 Inspired by Reid and Wittgenstein, Alston
thinks of a doxastic practice as a mechanism that has beliefs as outputs.
Some doxastic practices have experiences as inputs. Under favorable conditions, socially established doxastic practices may rationally be supposed
to confer prima facie epistemic justification on the beliefs that are their outputs. Doxastic practices come equipped with systems of background
beliefs that serve as overriders for the prima facie justification of the output
beliefs. Rebutters are overriders that provide reasons for believing that an
output belief is false; underminers are overriders that provide reasons for
believing that an output belief is not adequately justified. If we charitably
construe what a community will let you get away with to be what the
overrider system of a community that shares a doxastic practice with experiential inputs does not rule out, then it is fair to say that what a community will let you get away with is what counts as an epistemically justified
report of experience. But, even on this charitable reading, what a community will let you get away with is not in general what counts as an accurate
report of experience. It is only in the special case of an overrider that is
also a rebutter that what a community will not let you get away with is
what counts as an inaccurate report of experience. Hence, from an
Alstonian point of view, which seems quite plausible to me, Rorty’s assertion about accuracy is guilty of running together considerations of justification and truth-related considerations of accuracy, and it is a false assertion.
According to Rorty, if one accepts the doctrine of the ontological priority
of the social, “then one will think that the question of the existence of God
is a question of the advantages and disadvantages of using God-talk over
against alternative ways of talking” (p. 58). I take it to be almost blindingly
obvious that the question of God’s existence is very different from any
question about how humans choose to talk. In any event, according to the
theological realism that has been the view of the majority of theists
throughout history, God would exist even if humans were to conclude that
God-talk is on balance disadvantageous to them and so were to abandon it.
To suppose that a human decision about how to use language would settle
the question of the existence of God is to attribute magical power to human
language. To be sure, as it has become increasingly clear that it is science,
not the humanities, that gives us power over nature, academic humanists
have become prone to activating the defense mechanism of exaggerating
the power of language. Alice Kaplan, a professor of French literature,
brings out some of the comedy and some of the pathos to which such an
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obsession with the power of language gives rise in an elegant memoir.5 It
strikes me as superstitious to hold that human linguistic behavior has
power over the existence of theological realities. If such a magical view of
the power of human language is a consequence of the doctrine of the ontological priority of the social, then we have what I take to be a conclusive
reason to reject that doctrine.
In sum, this collection of papers provides a window on a conversation
about theory and methods in religious studies. When I look through this
window, I see some interesting lore about religion and religious studies,
but I do not not see much that would be valuable to philosophers of religion whose primary disciplinary affiliation is philosophy.
NOTES
1. Richard Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,”
Journal of Religious Ethics 31.1 (2003), p. 142.
2. Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today (Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 59.
3. Ibid., p.60.
4. For details, see William P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1991), especially Chapter 4, “A ‘Doxastic Practice’
Approach to Epistemology.”
5. Alice Kaplan, French Lessons (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1993).

Christianity and Western Thought. Volume II: Faith and Reason in the 19th
Century, by Steve Wilkens and Alan G. Padgett. Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2000. Pp. 436. $30.00 (cloth).
ROBERT ROBERTS, Baylor University
Of their accessible history of 19th century ideas Wilkens and Padgett say,
“As an overview for students, our book is primarily a survey. Our purpose is to introduce the major figures in Western thought, primarily
philosophers, from a Christian perspective” (p.9). Chapters 2 and 5 and
the last two chapters (totalling about 150 of the 370 pages of text) are
devoted to theologians and social scientists. A distinctive mark of this history is its preoccupation with Christianity. The authors are particularly
interested in the religious views of the philosophers, poets, and social scientists they canvass, and seek to show how these interact with the authors’
(other) central views. After the discussion of each author’s ideas, they offer
a brief critical assessment and / or estimation of the author’s importance.
Their assessments strike me as fair, and as not reflecting any very particular or sectarian theological viewpoint. Often they simply report the main
criticisms that have been offered in the literature.
Another distinctive mark, as indicated in the title, is the theme of reason
or rationality, the nature of which is a very live question at or just below

